American Military Posture in the Black Sea:How the Pentagon Can Prevent a Strategic Mistake

By: Robert Hamilton and George Scutaru

America’s NATO allies are eagerly, and with some trepidation, awaiting the release of the Trump Administration’s National Defense Strategy, which will unveil the new American military posture in Europe. Rumors are swirling, with some implying that part of the troops currently stationed in Germany will either be withdrawn to the United States or redeployed along NATO’s eastern flank. The latter would be a logical decision meant to deter Russia’s aggressive behavior. Moscow is testing NATO’s reaction in the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania by violating Estonia’s airspace, conducting massive drone incursions in Poland, and drone overflights in Romania. Russia is not limiting its actions to the eastern flank countries but is pushing its hybrid operations further into Europe. Drones have appeared that block airports in Denmark or fly over military facilities in France, while cyberattacks are disrupting airports in Germany. Russia is also escalating in the maritime domain, targeting critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea or attacking Ukrainian ships on the Danube, just 0.1 miles from Romania’s river border.

NATO’s Ramstein Legacy 2024: multinational drills, fighter jets, and live-fire demonstrations.

NATO’S MK Airbase in Romania. Source: Wikimedia Commons. Courtesy Video of NATO.

But it is not guaranteed that the US will respond to Russia’s increasingly assertive behavior along NATO’s eastern flank by increasing the American presence there. Indeed, there are reports that the US might do the opposite, pulling forces out of Eastern Europe and returning them to the US. If this happens, it is almost certain that such a decision would affect the American presence at the Mihail Kogalniceanu Airbase, on the Black Sea coast, where approximately 2000 U.S. Army troops are currently deployed. This could happen during the next rotation of American troops, scheduled for the end of this year. Pulling US forces from Europe would repeat the strategic error of the 1990s, when the US – despite a chorus of warnings from Russia’s former satellites in Eastern Europe – reduced its military presence in Europe from some 300,000 troops to 30,000. This reduction in US presence on the continent was followed by increasingly aggressive Russian behavior in its self-described “near abroad”, beginning with the 2008 invasion of Georgia and culminating in the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Russia would interpret a withdrawal of American troops from Romania  and the rest of the eastern flank at a time when the U.S. is in talks with Moscow about peace in Ukraine as a concession. This would send a dangerous signal of declining US interest in the Black Sea region at the exact time Russia seeks to challenge NATO there and elsewherealong its eastern flank. It is trite but true to say that Russia is provoked by weakness and deterred by strength, and downsizing of the US presence in Europe would certainly convey weakness to the Kremlin at a critical time. Given this, the Pentagon would be making a major mistake if it were to withdraw or reduce its troops from Romania, especially now, in the current security context. The White House should not allow such a strategic error, which would affect the security interests of the United States itself as much as those of NATO or Romania.

The Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base is useful for projecting U.S. power and interests in the Middle East, and it has been used for support missions during the campaign against Iran, as it has been used for many years as a transit base for Afghanistan. President Trump mediated the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan on August 8 in Washington, and the Zangezur Corridor, now called TRIPP - the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, will be managed by the American side to ensure connectivity and prosperity in the region. The nearest air base is Mihail Kogalniceanu. Thus, Romania can help support U.S. plans to bring peace to the Caucasus. The United States has signed an agreement with Ukraine for the exploitation of rare earth minerals in Ukraine. The richest area in resources is in southern Ukraine. The NATO country closest to this region is Romania, and the nearest base is Mihail Kogălniceanu.

A withdrawal of American troops from Romania at a critical time in negotiations on Ukraine would be a serious mistake. Russia would take it as the U.S. giving it a free hand to act in the Black Sea, region which would increase tensions and the risk of escalation. This could increase Russian aggression in the Black Sea, where Russia is already conductingdrone incursions and aircraft flyovers near ships involved in installing offshore platforms for gas extraction. Three American companies are subcontractors in the infrastructure construction process for gas exploitation: Transocean, Halliburton, and Oceaneering. President Trump has asked Europe to stop importing oil and gas from Russia in order to weaken Moscow. Romania will become the largest natural gas producer in the EU by 2027, when offshore gas extraction in the Black Sea begins. Romania will export gas to Germany starting in 2027, will be able to supply the Balkan states, and will help Hungary end its dependence on Russian gas. Thus, Romania will support the US policy of reducing Europe’s energy dependence on Russia.

A signal of flagging US resolve could entice Russia to expand its hybrid actions in Romania and elsewhere in the Black sea region. On January 17, 2025, a Colombian citizen was captured by the Romanian Intelligence Service and the Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism. His mission was to set fire to or blow up strategic targets in Romania. Another recent example occurred on October 21, 2025, when the Romanian Intelligence Service captured two Ukrainian citizens who were operating under the direct coordination of the Russian secret services. Their objective was to destroy, by setting fire, the headquarters of the NOVA POST company in Bucharest. These incidents clearly demonstrate that Russia’s hybrid actions against Romania will not stop; on the contrary, they are likely to become increasingly aggressive.

Romania is a staunch ally of Washington in the Black Sea region, having stood by the United States from the very beginning in Afghanistan and Iraq, when the fight against terrorism began after 9/11. Twenty-seven Romanian soldiers died there and more than one hundred were wounded, an act of unwavering solidarity on Romania’s part. At the time of the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, Romania was the fifth-largest troop-contributing nation.

Romania is investing in Europe’s conventional defense, taking on clear responsibilities in Southeastern Europe. After the invasion of Crimea, Romania increased defense spending to 2% of GDP and has committed to reaching 5% of GDP for defense by 2035. Bucharest is investing heavily in host nation support capabilities. Romania is in the process of expanding the Mihail Kogălniceanu base, where it will invest 2.5 billion USD of national funds by 2030. It is also investing 419 million USD in the expansion of the Câmpia Turzii Air Base, where it hosts on a rotational basis U.S. aircraft such as F-16, F-35, F-22, and MQ Reaper drones. Romania purchases a significant amount of American military equipment. The latest decision, made immediately after President Trump’s election, is to acquire 32 F-35 aircraft (worth 6.5 billion USD)and 54 Abrams tanks (worth 1.2 billion USD). Romania has also purchased other systems from U.S. companies to improve interoperability with American forces, including      HIMARS, Patriot systems, F-16 aircraft, and Piranha 8X8 armored vehicles). There is excellent intelligence cooperation between Romania and the United States, without which the U.S. would know much less about what is happening in the Black Sea.      

Together with European partners, Romania is investing to increase its ammunition production to strengthen national defense. The war in Ukraine has clearly shown that a robust defense industrial base is a critical component to success in modern warfare. The German company Rheinmetall will build one of the largest gunpowder factories in Europe in Romania and will produce medium-caliber ammunition. Additionally, Romania is interested in using European funds from the SAFE program to produce drones in cooperation with Ukraine, Romania has been a leader among NATO member states in contributing to deterring Russia.

Maintaining the US military presence in Romania, and elsewhere along NATO’s eastern flank, would avoid a major strategic error. There are no valid financial or military reasons to withdraw US forces from NATO’s eastern flank, but there are serious risks to doing so. The cost to the US for maintaining its presence in Romania is minimal in the context of the overall US foreign presence, and Romania contributes a significant amount of its own funds to support the US presence. In terms of strategic effect, the US forces in Romania are doing far more than they would on either the US southern border or the Pacific theater. The US southern border is an intelligence and law enforcement problem, and therefore not one that an Army brigade or two can solve. And moving these forces to the Pacific would do little to deter China. The most likely cause of a US-China conflict is a Chinese move against Taiwan, but stationing large numbers of US forces there would require a change of US policy, which currently allows for training missions only. This means they would likely have to be stationed elsewhere in the region and be airlifted or sealifted to Taiwan in the event of a Chineseinvasion, making them easy targets for the PLA while enroute. While moving the forces currently in Romania to the US or the Pacific theater would not solve America’s problems in either place, it would certainly harm U.S. interests in the Black Sea region and would do a great favor to Russia. It would convey weakness and lack of resolve in Europe, making a major concession to Putin by withdrawing troops from the closest base to Crimea and Sevastopol, precisely now, when the US needs to convey  strength as it negotiates with the Kremlin over Ukraine.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Robert Hamilton

Dr. Robert (Bob) Hamilton is the President of Delphi Global Research Center. He served 30 years in the U.S. Army. retiring as a Colonel, and six years as a civilian professor at the U.S. Army War College. In his Army career, he served overseas in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Germany, Belarus, Georgia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Dr. Hamilton received his PhD in International Relations and his MA in Russian Studies from the University of Virginia, and his BS in National Security Affairs from the United States Military Academy. He is also a graduate of the German Armed Forces Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.

He is the author of the book China-Russia Relations:The Dance of the Dragon and the Bear (2024, Springer) and of over forty articles and monographs published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and in outlets such as Orbis, Parameters, Forbes, The American Interest, and Defense One.  His current book project examines the effectiveness of US military assistance at building capability to deter aggression.

George Scutaru

George Scutaru is one of the founders and the CEO of the New Strategy Center (www.newstrategycenter.ro), the leading Romanian think tank in security and foreign affairs field, founded in July 2015. He started his professional career in journalism, in Bucharest, then as a press correspondent to Moscow, before he became the general director of a press monitoring and consultancy agency in Romania.

Between 2004 and 2014 he was a member of the Parliament of Romania, the Chamber of Deputies. In that period, he successively held the positions of Secretary (2004-2008) and Vice-Chairman (2008-2014) of the Committee on Defense and National Security. Between 2014 and 2015 he was national security advisor to the President of Romania. On behalf of the President, Scutaru coordinated the entire negotiation process for the national agreement, assumed in 2015 by all Romanian political parties from the Parliament, for a 2% of the GDP financing of the defense sector, which triggered an extensive modernization process of the Romanian Armed Forces and enhanced the interoperability with NATO and the US.

George Scutaru

George Scutaru is one of the founders and the CEO of the New Strategy Center (www.newstrategycenter.ro), the leading Romanian think tank in security and foreign affairs field, founded in July 2015.

He started his professional career in journalism, in Bucharest, then as a press correspondent to Moscow, before he became the general director of a press monitoring and consultancy agency in Romania.

Between 2004 and 2014 he was a member of the Parliament of Romania, the Chamber of Deputies. In that period, he successively held the positions of Secretary (2004-2008) and Vice-Chairman (2008-2014) of the Committee on Defense and National Security. Between 2014 and 2015 he was national security advisor to the President of Romania. On behalf of the President, Scutaru coordinated the entire negotiation process for the national agreement, assumed in 2015 by all Romanian political parties from the Parliament, for a 2% of the GDP financing of the defense sector, which triggered an extensive modernization process of the Romanian Armed Forces and enhanced the interoperability with NATO and the US.

George graduated from the Faculty of History (University of Bucharest) and holds a master’s degree in International Relations. He also graduated from the National Defense College and the National Intelligence College in Bucharest, and also attended training courses and programs at the NATO College in Rome, the G.C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and the US Department of State.

Area of expertise: Russia, security challenges in the Black Sea region. He is author of several studies dedicated to Russia’s strategy in the Black Sea region, Russian hybrid warfare and aspects related to energy security in the wider Black Sea region.

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