Sino-Russian Relations: Unlimited Partnership or Hierarchical Friendship?
In recent years, Russia and China have cultivated the image of a powerful anti-Western relationship. They have repeatedly emphasized their “No Limits” partnership and common opposition to what they describe as Western hegemony. Nevertheless, beneath the surface of the diplomatic pleasantries, joint military exercises, and staged leadership summits lie deep incompatibilities and increasingly widening contradictions in several domains- territorial, geopolitical, economic, technological, and military. These historical fractures and grievances challenge the sustainability of their alliance while revealing their underlying rivalry.
As the international system undergoes a structural transformation, the relationship between Russia and China will emerge as one of its defining issues. The current geopolitical turmoil has drawn China and Russia closer, with Moscow becoming increasingly dependent on Beijing across economic, technological, political, and even military dimensions. Unlike the Cold War, when their realignment was mainly driven by shared ideology, the current partnership is driven by ideology, marriage of convenience, pragmatism, and necessity, particularly for Putin’s Russia, which finds itself increasingly isolated from the West following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Growing Economic Dependence on China
The conflict with the collective West, particularly with the European Union (EU), has been the main factor in accelerating Moscow’s pivot to Beijing. Once Russia’s largest trade partner and energy customer, the EU swiftly cut economic ties, imposed sanctions, and reduced its energy dependency on Moscow.
Key gas pipelines are now non-operational, and European companies have left the Russian market en masse. In their places, Chinese firms have expanded their footprint- buying up Russian energy assets, entering the consumer market, and embedding Chinese standards into Russian industry, forcing it to turn towards Chinese-dominated institutions and networks.
Moreover, Russia’s growing isolation from the West pushed Moscow to turn to China as a lifeline for its battered economy. From 2022 bilateral trade between the neighbors has surged dramatically surpassing $240 billion in 2023-a record figure. China currently accounts for more than 30% of Russia’s imports, supplying everything from consumer electronics and industrial machinery to microchips and cars. Conversely, Russian exports to China are increasingly dominated by raw material-especially oil, gas, and coal.
The ongoing trade dynamic between the two reflects growing asymmetric interdependence. While Russia provides the resources, China dictates terms. Russian fossil fuels are sold at a discount due to limited alternative buyers, providing China a significant price advantage. For instance the Power of Siberia 2 project is a clear example: by deliberately prolonging negotiations, China exploits Moscow’s urgent need to secure new buyers, pressing it into accepting terms that favoring China. This unequal partnership and growing dependence on China, put Russia in a position akin to a resource colony, echoing patterns seen in China’s relationship with countries in Africa and Central Asia.
Technological Dependency
Russia’s growing technological dependence on China places it at risk of falling into China’s technological vassalage. The Western sanctions have effectively restricted Russia’s access to advanced technology-semiconductors, aerospace components, and defense-related electronics. To circumvent these restrictions, Russia has leaned heavily on Chinese suppliers. China not only provided dual-use technologies and commercial components, but it has also stepped into delivering military-grade hardware, making it even more important for Russian efforts to continue the war.
Russia’s technological isolation from the West and its growing dependence on China’s technological might have increased the technological imbalance as it has taken a toll on Russia’s ability to innovate and manufacture, particularly in sectors like telecommunications, aerospace, and IT, relying on China’s standards, platforms, and infrastructure. Huawei and other Chinese technological companies are increasingly replacing Western technology in Russia’s digital ecosystem, further cementing its reliance on China. The increasing technological imbalance has led to growing resentment in Russia’s defense and technological circles, who have often expressed concerns about becoming too dependent on Chinese tech. In 2023, Bloomberg reported a confidential memo drafted in 2022 by Russia’s Ministry of Digital Development-where the document warns that reliance on Chinese technology firms such as Huawei could endanger national security and crowd out domestic alternatives.
Military Ties
Even though both countries coordinate on strategic issues and conduct joint military exercises regularly, the lack of their interoperability and overall thin military ties, reveals deep-seated military mistrust between the two. Unlike the Cold War period, Russia is a junior partner in this axis-its battered military and overstretched economy make it less of an equal and more of a dependent. Notwithstanding their claims of friendship and no limits partnership, they have no formal defense pact. Russian elites often express their concerns about China’s military modernization, and its strategic enlargement- the ongoing naval buildup and inroads made in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. While their joint military drills such as Vostok and Joint Sea exercises are often touted as a sign of great military cooperation, both sides constantly prepare contingency plans in case their current cooperation turns into a sudden military confrontation. Moreover, these military drills and naval exercises rarely involve full integration or sharing sensitive information. Overall, the Russian elites remain skeptical of Beijing’s long-term intentions as they witness China’s rapid economic modernization, militarization, and technological leap. As a former Russian General, Leonid Iashov stated Russia will eventually have to defend its Far East-not from NATO, but from its partner in the East.
Territorial Disputes
Although both the Chinese and Russian governments officially dismiss territorial disputes, their historical grievances simmer beneath the surface as China’s long-term strategy aims for the return of its historical territories. For centuries both sides clashed over the control of the Far East. With the 1858 and 1860 treaties (Treaty of Aigun and Treaty of Peking) signed by both sides, China ceded a large swath of territory to the Russian Empire.
Although the two sides signed a broader demarcation agreement in 2004, prominent nationalist voices in China still refer to these agreements as “unequal Treaties”. Chinese maps and school books have occasionally sparked controversy by referring to the Russian Far East as historically Chinese. In parallel, Moscow has grown concerned about Chinese demographic and economic penetration into its sparsely populated but resource-rich regions of Siberia and the Russian Far East. Russia’s war of attrition in Ukraine has exhausted its military resources in regions bordering China, making these areas extremely vulnerable in the years to come. Weak and weakened Russia is good for China, as the moment of China’s territorial integrity restoration begins.
Political Subservience
During its efforts to avoid military defeat in Ukraine and survive Western sanctions, Moscow lost regional influence and its strategic autonomy-trading one dependency for another, this time, on far more dangerous, brutal, and ascending global power-China.
What was once a strategic partnership between two great powers, is rapidly transforming into a hierarchical relationship. The Kremlin is increasingly subordinated to Beijing as its strategic leverage is waning dramatically since its invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s growing dependence on China’s economic, technological, and military support has gradually translated into a loss of political and strategic autonomy. Russia, which before the war in Ukraine positioned itself as a global powerhouse, a center of gravity, and an independent pole in a multipolar world order has increasingly become deferential to Beijing’s global vision. In organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Beijing sets the agenda while Moscow follows.
China’s Ascendency in Central Asia
In recent decades, China has eclipsed Moscow as the dominant economic force in Central Asia. As Russia’s economic clout has decreased in the region, China has moved in as the region’s leading investor and trading partner. China-Central Asia trade surpassed $90 billion in 2023, a dramatic increase from a decade ago- Whereas Russia’s trade turnover remained around US S44 billion with the region in 2023 reflecting clear signs of decline and economic stagnation due to the Western sanctions and economic contraction. The structural shift is also evident in other areas as regional actors are increasingly aligning themselves with China’s interests-such as infrastructure, connectivity, and loans, distancing themselves from Russia’s increasingly militarized foreign policy.
Russia’s attempts to employ its cultural, linguistic, and military linkages to maintain its influence in the region have proved less effective in coping with the Chinese geostrategic push. By taking advantage of Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, China has outmaneuvered it through a mix of economic investments, technological integration, and strategic diplomacy.
Russia’s economic isolation contributed to the rise of the Trans-Caspian International Route-also known as the Middle Corridor-offering China an alternative to Russia’s Northern Corridor. The Middle Corridor links China to Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus, marginalizing Russia’s role as the primary Eurasian land bridge while reducing China’s reliance on Russian trade routes and infrastructure networks. The recent the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement and the establishment of the US-brokered Nakhichevan corridor mark a significant step forward isolating Russia and enhancing the viability of the Middle Corridor.
Beijing is now the largest trade partner for all five Central Asian states. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has invested billions in developmental projects -roads, railways, energy pipelines, and logistical hubs, integrating the region into the Chinese supply chain and economic ecosystem. For instance, China has invested in Kazakhstan’s oil, uranium, and rare earth extraction sectors, while providing Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with loans for hydroelectric, and mining projects-turning them into debtor economies increasingly reliant on China. As Russia’s influence wanes in Central Asia, China’s approach to the region becomes even more systematic and long-term- integrating the whole region into China’s economic structure and making it ever more dependent on Chinese financing, technology, and logistics.
In parallel, China has been effective in expanding its technological clout in the region. With its state-backed enterprises, it penetrated Central Asian states’ technological ecosystem, replacing the Soviet and Russian technological legacies. While China’s technological wing of power projection has often been overlooked, it has become one of its most powerful means of influence in Central Asia and beyond. With the Digital Silk Road, China’s technological companies have built the region’s major telecommunication networks, surveillance systems, e-commerce platforms, and cloud infrastructure, laying the groundwork for technological and ultimately geopolitical influence.
While Huawei and ZTE dominate telecoms infrastructure in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, smart city and facial recognition systems provided by China are operational in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, increasing Chinese influence through surveillance and digital authoritarianism. Baidu’s provision in the satellite ecosystem as an alternative to GPS, even in military and transport applications, is increasing China’s control gradually displacing Russian navigation and data systems. This combination of factors not only modernizes Central Asia on China’s terms but also displaces Russia’s Soviet era technological legacy, erasing Russia’s role as the region’s tech provider. By supplying technologies and systems for policing, surveillance, and domestic stability, Beijing enables Central Asian governments to exert greater control over their populations. In return, Beijing gains valuable data, political leverage, and growing political influence.
Consequently, Russia’s strategic failure in Ukraine has absorbed its resources and accelerated the ongoing geopolitical shift in Central Asia-turning Beijing, not Moscow into the region’s true center of gravity.
China’s Growing Influence in the South Caucasus
In recent years, Beijing has also expanded its clout in the South Caucasus-Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. China’s increasing influence is largely driven by economic and developmental initiatives through the BRI. While China does not intend openly to displace Russia's regional standing, its increasing presence poses a serious long-term challenge to Moscow’s traditional dominance in the South Caucasus.
Since Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the geopolitical significance of the wider South Caucasus has grown markedly. Russia’s political, economic, and financial isolation has led to a sharp decline of nearly 50 percent in its role as a primary trade corridor for China. The ongoing strategic shift has gradually redirected East-West commerce toward alternative routes, most notably the Middle Corridor. Strategically situated at the heart of this emerging route, the South Caucasus has become a critical transit hub linking Europe and Asia. Given the increase in trade turnover between East and West and the growing economic dynamic between Europe and China, annual shipments along the Middle Corridor via the South Caucasus are projected to surpass 10 million tons by 2030, diminishing Russia’s long-standing significance as a primary trade corridor connecting Asia with the lucrative European market.
China, recognizing the South Caucasus' pivotal role in the development of the Middle Corridor, has expanded its economic footprint in the region. In recent years, China signed Free Trade Agreements with Georgia and Azerbaijan, and established Visa Free Regimes with all three South Caucasus states while becoming one of the top trade partners of the whole region. Through its BRI, China has invested heavily in the region’s infrastructure, energy sector, logistics, and industrial zones-supporting the rapid development of seaports, highways, and railways, securing direct access to the Black Sea.
Through these efforts, China aims to anchor the South Caucasus firmly within the BRI framework, linking Central Asia with Europe through the South Caucasus and establishing a direct gateway to the European market. In doing so, China seeks to reshape, monopolize, and enhance the regional connectivity while bypassing Russia’s trade routes.
Beijing’s influence is primarily elite-driven. China has not only increased trade and built infrastructure projects in the South Caucasus, but also supplied local governments with techno-authoritarian technologies including but not limited to surveillance systems, facial recognition software, and big data policing platforms and social management systems-technologies that support internal control often at the expense of civil liberties.
While much of the global focus has been on how these tools are employed in China, Africa, or Asia, a quieter transformation is taking place in the South Caucasus as the internal management technologies are increasingly reshaping the region’s governance landscape, empowering ruling parties and entrenching Chinese influence. Under the guise of the “Smart City” projects or crime prevention tools, the Chinese techno companies such as Huawei, Hikvision, Dahua, and ZTE supply governments-Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia- with tools that enable them to monitor, predict, and suppress dissent.
China has deepened its influence across the South Caucasus, by expanding its footprint in media culture and academia. State-backed media outlets, social platforms, diplomatic channels, and business-linked organizations bolster China’s image as an economic success story and dependable partner. Confucius Institutes offer Chinese language and cultural courses, host cultural and educational events like “China’s Day” as well as -organize HSK exam (Standardized of Chinese language for non-speakers) and Chinese Bridge Competition while organizing thematic conferences. As Russian educational funding wanes and is pushed out, China is positioning itself as a dominant actor in the regional education and cultural exchange. Thus, in addition to using other means of power projection, China is engaged in embedding soft power in the academic and cultural fabrics of the South Caucasus, nurturing future generations with pro-China affinities, and fostering long-term societal and political alignment across the region.
Considering Russia’s growing dependence on China, Moscow is forced to tolerate China’s increasing regional engagement and its enhanced cooperation with local actors. China is not yet a dominant force in the South Caucasus, but its growing economic footprint and geopolitical influence pose a structural challenge to Russia’s traditional dominance in the region. For Russia, the South Caucasus has become yet another region, where it must accommodate China’s growing ambitions, or be gradually sidelined in a region it once considered its uncontested backyard.
Conclusion
Moscow’s rejection of a ceasefire and Washington’s failed peace efforts reflect a deeper reality: China’s tightening grip on Russia’s foreign policy, a widening power imbalance, and an increasingly hierarchical Russo-Chinese relationship. It can be said that Beijing has gradually emerged as one of the primary beneficiaries of the conflict in Ukraine, exploiting the war to advance its economic, political and strategic interests. With Moscow increasingly isolated economically, politically and technologically from the West, Beijing has made itself as Russia’s indispensable partner, expanding trade, technological cooperation and political alignment.
China has leveraged this dependency to gain greater access to Russian military technology-opportunities that did not exist before the war- while using Russia’s war as testing ground for its own technology and military innovations. In parallel, China increased its exports to Russia, replaced many Western goods on Russian market while deepening Russia’s economic reliance on China’s supply chain.
The war also has served Beijing’ strategic aims of keeping the U.S. preoccupied in Europe, diverting western attention and resources away from China. A weakened, but functioning Russia ensures that the U.S. is tied down in Europe, buying Beijing time to build its own defenses and consolidate its influence elsewhere. By supporting Moscow just enough to sustain its war effort-but not enough to allow a decisive victory- Beijing maintains leverage over Moscow while ensuring the war continues to erode Western unity and resources.
Beyond Europe, the conflict accelerates China’s expansion in the post-Soviet space, where Russia’s diminished influence has created power vacuum for China to fill. Chinese firms, investments and political influence is across Central Asia, the South Caucasus and parts of Eastern Europe, eroding Russia’s historical influence.
In addition, the war in Ukraine provides China with valuable insights into Western military strategy, sanction regimes and information warfare, giving it a strategic edge in preparing for future conflicts. Hence, the key to resolving the conflict in Ukraine may lie as much in Beijing as in Washington or Moscow-because China has both the leverage over Russia and the incentive to prolong a conflict that serves its global interests.
The Partnership with no limits between two great powers is gradually transforming into a hierarchical relationship. Economically, and technologically Russia is increasingly subordinate to China. Politically the Kremlin’s leverage is waning. Its isolation from Europe and diminishing role in Eurasia- particularly Central Asia and the South Caucasus, makes it more dependent on China’s goodwill and access than ever. This ongoing geopolitical dynamic has helped Beijing gain access to cheap resources, geopolitical flexibility, and influence in Russia’s former spheres of influence. Hence, in the search for a partner to survive Western sanctions, and international isolation, Russia diminished its international standing and lost strategic autonomy.
