Rethinking US Military Aid to Georgia or How to Stop Rewarding Democratic Backsliding

Service members from all participating allied and partner nations, including U.S. Soldiers and Marines, stand in formation at the opening ceremony of Exercise Agile Spirit 23 at the Joint Training and Evaluation Center near Tbilisi, Georgia, Aug. 21, 2023. (US Army photo by Markus Rauchenberger)

During a recent hearing in the US Congress, Representative Joe Wilson recalled that three of his sons had served in Iraq and Afghanistan alongside Georgian troops. “They knew that if Georgians were there, they were safe,” he stated. His testimony came at a time of growing concern over Georgia’s democratic backsliding and its increasingly strained relationship with the West. In response, the US House of Representatives adopted the bipartisan MEGOBARI Act, aimed at addressing Georgia’s democratic regression by imposing sanctions on responsible individuals in the Georgian government, supporting civil society, and signaling political consequences for continued authoritarian drift. However, while much of the recent discourse in the West on Georgia has rightly focused on democratic decline it leaves a crucial dimension untouched: US security assistance continues on autopilot, still flowing through established channels designed for a different era—when Georgia was seen as a reform leader and model partner.

Built with years of American funding, training, and strategic engagement, the Georgian Defense Forces (GDF) were once considered a showcase of successful post-Soviet military reform. That legacy is now in jeopardy. While Washington debates democratic standards, it risks overlooking the quiet erosion of a key US security investment. The current approach fails to account for how a dysfunctional political environment harms an institution in which American taxpayers have invested heavily. This presents an acute policy dilemma for the United States. On one hand, continued security assistance without conditions risks legitimizing and enabling a government that is drifting away from shared democratic values. On the other hand, cutting off aid entirely would weaken Georgia’s defense institutions, increase Russian influence in the region, and ultimately undermine US strategic interests.

The dilemma is sharpened by the Georgian government’s efforts to distance itself from the very partnerships that once defined its Western trajectory. In recent statements, Georgian Dream officials have reframed Georgia’s military deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan in transactional terms. Irakli Kadagishvili, Chair of the Parliamentary Procedural Issues Committee, dismissed these contributions as benefiting “foreigners who were too lazy to send their own troops,” adding that it was “ten times cheaper” to send Georgians. In a May 2025 open letter to Donald Trump and Senator J.D. Vance, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze claimed that Georgia had “saved” the United States $2.5 billion. Beyond their factual inaccuracy, such statements reflect a deliberate political effort to detach the current government from the foundational alliances that once anchored Georgia’s Western alignment.

The historical record stands in stark contrast to this revisionism. Through programs like the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (GSSOP), and Georgia Defense Readiness Program (GDRP), US support transformed the GDF into a NATO-interoperable force with strong credibility. These efforts focused not just on building capability, but on embedding values like transparency, civilian oversight, and Western alignment. Via the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, dozens of officers were educated in top US academies and hundreds more attended other US military schools—helping staff key roles in Georgia's military leadership.

Georgia’s contributions to missions in Iraq and Afghanistan were operationally significant and politically meaningful. GTEP, in particular, marked an inflection point: it anchored Georgia’s pro-Western foreign policy and elevated the strategic weight of the Georgian military far beyond what the country’s size would suggest.[1] That legacy remains relevant even amid current democratic backsliding. For many of Georgia’s advocates in Washington, the GDF continues to serve as a reminder of what US assistance can achieve when paired with political will.

For many of Georgia’s advocates in Washington, the GDF continues to serve as a reminder of what US assistance can achieve when paired with political will.

But the very success of that assistance also masked a deeper vulnerability. US aid made Georgia’s armed forces tactically proficient—but it did not sufficiently develop the institutional capacity needed to sustain or govern those forces over the long term. The focus on tactical effectiveness often came at the expense of building strategic-level capabilities: defense planning, budgeting, oversight, and civil-military coordination. As a result, the system remained externally dependent and politically fragile.

This imbalance has become more visible as Georgia’s domestic politics have deteriorated. Without robust institutions to protect professional standards, the GDF is increasingly susceptible to politicization. Aid that was once designed to advance reform can now be absorbed by a system that lacks the capacity—or the political will—to maintain it on democratic terms. In this context, continuing security assistance without adaptation risks undermining the very goals it was meant to serve.

Moreover, concerns about the strategic viability of Georgia’s defense sector predate its current political crisis. As Robert E. Hamilton noted in 2021, US military assistance had produced meaningful improvements on the ground, but “Georgia continues to suffer from many of the same shortcomings that have plagued its armed forces for two decades,” including persistent readiness issues and weak institutional foundations. These vulnerabilities have only been exacerbated by the political backsliding and strategic inertia that followed the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine made clear that credible national defense requires more than trained battalions and modern weapons. It demands a whole-of-society approach grounded in strategic planning, institutional coordination, and public resilience. Georgia, despite facing a comparable threat environment, has failed to internalize these lessons. The country still lacks an updated National Security Concept, has not approved a revised National Defense Strategy that reflects post-2022 realities, and continues to operate without interagency mechanisms suited for protracted national security challenge

Meanwhile, Georgia’s defense posture remains out of sync with its security environment. Unlike many NATO partners that responded to the war in Ukraine by boosting their defense budgets, Georgia has made only marginal adjustments—despite widespread public support for increased investment in national defense. This was a missed opportunity. Rather than using this window of societal readiness to strengthen deterrence, the government opted to do less, not more.

Most alarmingly, in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an episode reported by multiple sources exposed the Georgian government’s anti-American disposition and weakened the moral resilience of its population. The United States reportedly invited the Georgian Ministry of Defense to prepare a list of its Soviet-era weaponry for transfer to Ukraine in exchange for American-made systems. While likely a standard proposal sent to several countries positioned to supply Ukraine with familiar equipment, in Georgia’s case it also offered the chance to modernize its equipment and strengthen capabilities while Russia was bogged down in Ukraine. The government rejected the proposal and instead portrayed it as evidence that the United States was trying to drag Georgia into the war, using this claim to advance an anti-national and anti-Western narrative.

This episode set the tone for a broader pattern in which the government manipulates strategic communication to prioritize political messaging over national resilience. Rather than informing the public about the requirements of credible defense policy, Georgian Dream has promoted the idea that aligning with Ukraine or investing in defense risks provoking a “second front” with Russia. This framing has distorted public debate, suppressed discussion of realistic security needs, and eroded the country’s greatest strategic asset: its high societal will to resist external aggression. As Will Neal reported, strategic communication units established with NATO and US support to counter Russian disinformation were eventually co-opted by the government and used to disseminate anti-Western narratives. This reversal highlights a dangerous misuse of assistance originally intended to build resilience—transforming a tool of deterrence into an instrument of regime consolidation.

Equally troubling is the loss of institutional talent. The Ministry of Defense has dismissed a number of professionals who received their education in the West—often thanks to direct support from the United States and its allies. These individuals were instrumental in driving reforms, enhancing NATO interoperability, and coordinating international assistance. Their removal not only disrupted continuity but also squandered the institutional memory they carried—an asset that cannot be easily replaced. That the US continued defense cooperation “as usual” even after their dismissal suggests a failure to safeguard its own investment.

In short, Georgia lacks an updated political framework to guide national defense, has not adjusted its defense budget to match emerging threats, dismissed key defense professionals, and—most critically—has weakened the societal resilience that once served as a cornerstone of its deterrence posture. Without strategic direction, adequate investment, or an engaged public, Georgia’s ability to deter threats and manage crises will continue to erode.

Without strategic direction, adequate investment, or an engaged public, Georgia’s ability to deter threats and manage crises will continue to erode.

One of the first visible US responses to Georgia’s democratic backsliding was the indefinite suspension of the 2024 Noble Partner military exercise. Yet, in other areas, defense cooperation with Georgia’s Ministry of Defense has continued uninterrupted. Most notably, the Georgian Minister of Defense regularly participates in the Ramstein-format Ukraine Defense Contact Group, despite Georgia offering no substantive assistance to Ukraine. This contradiction is difficult to justify. Noble Partner is precisely the kind of exercise that strengthens Georgia’s deterrence capabilities and contributes to regional efforts to contain Russia. Suspending such a strategically meaningful initiative—while allowing participation in symbolic formats that serve domestic political PR and regime legitimation—is counterproductive.

If the United States aims to recalibrate its security assistance in response to democratic backsliding, it should start by preserving the programs that actually reinforce operational readiness and send clear strategic signals. These exercises should not only be preserved—they should become a central pillar of US strategic communications in Georgia. They send a message to Russia that the United States has not abandoned its commitments in the region. Just as importantly, they demonstrate to the Georgian public that the US remains engaged—not only diplomatically, but as a tangible security partner.

If the United States aims to recalibrate its security assistance in response to democratic backsliding, it should start by preserving the programs that actually reinforce operational readiness and send clear strategic signals.

Another critical area of engagement is officer education. This domain delivers long-term impact by shaping the mindset and values of future military leadership. However, for these programs to yield meaningful institutional results, the United States should adopt a more hands-on approach to candidate selection. There is precedent for this: the United Kingdom, for example, directly participates in selecting candidates for its Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) program. A more active US role in this process would ensure alignment with the broader strategic goal—cultivating a professional officer corps grounded in democratic norms and strategic discipline. All other forms of assistance to the Ministry of Defense—including training, equipping, arms procurement, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Foreign Military Sales (FMS)—should be governed by an uncompromising principle of conditionality: “more for more.” The more Georgia’s government demonstrates a willingness to return to the path of democratic governance, the more assistance it should receive.

Most importantly, however, the US Department of Defense and the State Department must show genuine flexibility and out-of-the-box thinking by engaging directly with democratic forces in Georgia to strengthen the country’s defense and security ecosystem. A robust security policy community—composed of experts, civil society actors, and reform-oriented stakeholders—can help lay the groundwork for long-term political consensus on national defense. If the Department of Defense lacks the institutional experience to engage with civil society directly, US think tanks and defense-focused NGOs could serve as intermediaries. Over time, this approach would foster a new equilibrium in civil-military relations—one in which defense issues can be effectively debated, shaped, and advanced across future governments, regardless of political alignment.

Georgia is becoming a test case for whether US security assistance can be made responsive to both strategic and democratic concerns. Business-as-usual risks legitimizing illiberal drift. Recalibrated assistance—grounded in conditionality and broader institutional engagement—offers a way forward. It is not only about deterring Russia or reforming defense ministries, but about safeguarding the credibility of US policy in fragile democracies across the globe. Georgia deserves a policy that is clear-eyed, strategic, and honest about what it takes to build sustainable security.

Georgia is becoming a test case for whether US security assistance can be made responsive to both strategic and democratic concerns.

But Washington must go further. The Department of Defense and the State Department should move beyond traditional, government-centric models of engagement and begin working directly with Georgia’s democratic actors to strengthen the country’s defense and security community. This includes think tanks, academics, reform-oriented officers, and civil society organizations with a credible stake in the country’s future. If the US security establishment lacks the institutional pathways to do this alone, it should leverage its own ecosystem—partnering with American think tanks and NGOs that have the expertise to build meaningful, nonpartisan capacity on the ground.

Such a shift would lay the foundation for a new civil-military equilibrium in Georgia—one in which national defense becomes a matter of shared responsibility rather than political expediency. It would ensure that US assistance empowers institutions, not regimes; builds resilience, not dependency; and supports a future in which Georgia can defend itself not only with capable forces, but with democratic legitimacy and strategic clarity.

[1] Korneli Kakachia and Michael Cecire, eds., Georgian Foreign Policy: The Quest for Sustainable Security (Tbilisi: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2013).